Opened 14 years ago
Closed 12 years ago
#16008 closed New feature (fixed)
Django does not provide any protection against DNS rebinding
| Reported by: | adehnert | Owned by: | nobody |
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| Component: | HTTP handling | Version: | 1.3 |
| Severity: | Normal | Keywords: | |
| Cc: | adehnert | Triage Stage: | Accepted |
| Has patch: | yes | Needs documentation: | yes |
| Needs tests: | yes | Patch needs improvement: | no |
| Easy pickings: | no | UI/UX: | no |
Description
Django currently does not provide any protection against DNS rebinding attacks. The CsrfProtection page suggests that it make be useful to add such protection.
Attachments (1)
Change History (8)
by , 14 years ago
| Attachment: | 0001-Add-DNS-rebinding-protection.patch added |
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comment:1 by , 14 years ago
| Has patch: | set |
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| Needs tests: | set |
I've attached a patch that provides some simple protection, in terms of validating that the Host header matches a fixed list of possible values. It probably needs tests and documentation, but I figured feedback on the code first would be good.
comment:2 by , 14 years ago
| Cc: | added |
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comment:3 by , 14 years ago
| Component: | Uncategorized → HTTP handling |
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| Needs documentation: | set |
| Triage Stage: | Unreviewed → Design decision needed |
comment:4 by , 14 years ago
| Triage Stage: | Design decision needed → Accepted |
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This is definitely something we are interested in, and the patch is definitely a good start, thanks.
There are some other things to consider, like the possibility of using the Sites framework so that you don't have to specify the domain twice, and there will probably be some discussion on django-devs very shortly about this.
As you say, we'd need docs and tests, and there is no reason not to start writing these already if you are interested. Things will probably need to change, but a solid base for discussing additions and changes is always very helpful, for docs as well as for code. The docs help people to see how hard it is to it up, which is a particularly important consideration for security features.
In terms of what is there already, just one nit: _get_failure_view adds a layer of indirection that we don't need if we are only calling it once - I would inline it into HostMatchMiddleware._reject. (Yes, the same criticism is true of the CSRF code you obviously based this on - that is an historical accident, and should be fixed).
comment:7 by , 12 years ago
| Resolution: | → fixed |
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| Status: | new → closed |
The last security release introduced a mandatory ALLOWED_HOSTS setting, resolving this ticket.
(I'm not sure to understand what a DNS rebinding attack is, but both the wiki page and the patch propose a Host whitelist as a countermeasure, and that's what ALLOWED_HOSTS does too.)
Patch to provide protection against DNS rebinding attacks